

Message Text

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FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2323

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 VIENNA 3018

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: APRIL 4 PRESENTATION
ON THE COMMON CEILING

ON APRIL 3 THE AHG APPROVED A PRESENTATION ON THE COMMON
CEILING, WHICH WAS DELIVERED AT THE APRIL 4 PLENARY BY FRG
REP BEHREND. THE ENGLISH TEXT APPROVED BY THE AHG
FOLLOWS. THE FRG PRESENTATION WILL BE IN GERMAN:
BEGIN TEXT:
MR. CHAIRMAN,

1. BEFORE THE COMING RECESS, MY COLLEAGUES AND I WOULD
LIKE TO FOCUS ONCE MORE ON A KEY ELEMENT OF THE WESTERN
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OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS OF 22 NOVEMBER, 1973: THE COMMON CEILING.

2. AS YOU WILL RECALL, THIS CONCEPT HAS FROM THE BEGINNING BEEN FUNDAMENTAL TO OUR APPROACH TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS. IN THEIR OPENING STATEMENTS OF 30 AND 31 OCTOBER, 1973, WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES PROPOSED A COMMON CEILING FOR GROUND FORCES OF EAST AND WEST IN CENTRAL EUROPE. I MYSELF POINTED OUT THAT THE AGREED PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY IN ITS CONCRETE APPLICATION TO THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE IMPLIED A CONCRETE FINAL NEGOTIATION GOAL: TO ACHIEVE, AT A LOWER LEVEL, APPROXIMATE PARITY BETWEEN THE GROUND FORCES ON EITHER SIDE IN FORM OF A COMMON CEILING.

3. SUBSEQUENTLY, WE DESCRIBED THIS ULTIMATE GOAL IN MORE DETAIL IN PARA. 3 OF OUR OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS. I QUOTE: "THE GOAL OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF APPROXIMATE PARITY BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES, IN THE FORM OF A COMMON CEILING FOR OVERALL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER ON EACH SIDE IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT COMBAT CAPABILITY. THE COMMON CEILING SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED AT LOWER LEVELS OF FORCES. THIS CEILING MIGHT BE SET AT APPROXIMATELY 700,000 SOLDIERS ON EACH SIDE."

4. WITH THIS IN MIND, WE HAVE PROPOSED IN PARA. 10 OF OUR OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS THAT A PHASE I AGREEMENT SHOULD BE THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS SUCH A COMMON CEILING AND SHOULD THEREFORE INCLUDE AGREEMENT ON ITS CONCEPT. WE HAVE THUS MADE THE POINT THAT A REDUCTIONS FORMULA WHICH FAILED TO ADDRESS THIS ISSUE SATISFACTORILY COULD NOT PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR AN AGREEMENT.

5. AS MY COLLEAGUES AND I HAVE EXPLAINED ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS, A COMMON CEILING AS DESCRIBED WOULD NOT ONLY BE A JUST AND EQUITABLE OUTCOME OF THIS NEGOTIATION PROCESS; IT IS ALSO THE BEST WAY FOR GENUINELY IMPROVING OVERALL STABILITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND IN EUROPE AS A WHOLE. A COMMON CEILING AS PROPOSED WOULD INDEED BE IN THE DEFINITE SECURITY INTERESTS OF EITHER SIDE. ANY FORCE REDUCTIONS WHICH MAY BE AGREED SHOULD THUS BE REGARDED AS A MOVEMENT DIRECTED TOWARDS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF AN

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OVERALL COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

6. MR. CHAIRMAN, LET ME EXPLAIN ONCE MORE THE GENERAL RATIONALE FOR OUR COMMON CEILING APPROACH TO THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE:
-A COMMON CEILING ON OVERALL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER WOULD EFFECTIVELY DEAL WITH THE PARTICULAR DISPARITY IN CENTRAL

EUROPE WHICH IS THE PRINCIPAL POTENTIAL CAUSE OF INSTABILITY IN THIS AREA.

-A COMMITMENT TO REACH SUCH A COMMON CEILING WWOULD PROVIDE ALL PARTICIPANTS WITH NECESSARY ASSURANCES AS TO THE FINAL OUTCOME OF THE PROCESS OF REDUCTIONS IN WHICH THEY ARE ENGAGED.

7. LET ME COMMENT IN SOME DETAIL ON THE FIRST OF THESE POINTS. WHEN AGREEING ON 28 JUNE 1973 TO "CONTRIBUTE TO A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP", PARTICIPANTS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS WERE AWARE OF THE FACT THAT THE MILITARY

RELATIONSHIP IN CENTRAL EUROPE WAS FAR FROM BEING SATISFACTORILY STABLE. THEY WERE CONSCIOUS OF THE NECESSITY, IN THE INTEREST OF ALL COUNTRIES INVOLVED, TO REDUCE THE RISK OF WAR, PARTICULARLY NUCLEAR WAR. IN FACT, THIS IS WHAT OUR AGREED OBJECTIVES OF ENHANCING STABILITY AND STRENGTHENING SECURITY ARE ALL ABOUT. AS WE HAVE DEMONSTRATED HERE, RISK OF WAR, INCLUDING NUCLEAR WAR, IN CENTRAL EUROPE EMANATES FROM THE PRONOUNCED DISPARITY IN THE RELATIONSHIP OF GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA, A DISPARITY WHICH THEREFORE MUST BE REGARDED AND TREATED AS THE MAJOR AND MOST DANGEROUS SOURCE OF POTENTIAL INSTABILITY.

8. THIS IS SO BECAUSE IN A SITUATION OF OVERALL NUCLEAR PARITY, IT IS UNREALISTIC TO SUPPOSE THAT NUCLEAR WAR IN CENTRAL EUROPE WOULD OCCUR EXCEPT AS THE RESULT OF AN ESCALATION TO THE NUCLEAR LEVEL OF A CONFLICT INITIATED WITH CONVENTIONAL ACTION BY GROUND FORCES. SUCH ESCALATION MIGHT TAKE PLACE QUICKLY - BUT WOULD NOT TAKE PLACE UNLESS THERE WAS AN ARMED CONFLICT ALREADY BEGUN WITH CONVENTIONAL MEANS. IF THEREFORE THE RISK OF THE USE

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OF ANY KIND OF WEAPONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, AND OF THE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN PARTICULAR, IS EFFECTIVELY TO BE REDUCED, WE SHOULD ADDRESS OURSELVES TO THE POTENTIAL CAUSE, THE PARTICULAR MILITARY CIRCUMSTANCES, OF ANY CONCEIVABLE ARMED CONFLICT. ACCORDINGLY THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR IS REDUCED BY ELIMINATING THE DESTABILIZING EFFECT OF THE LACK OF A BALANCED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE GROUND FORCES ON EITHER SIDE.

9. A COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER, AND A REDUCTION OF THE VERY LARGE EASTERN SUPERIORITY IN TANKS, WOULD THEREFORE BE THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT STEP PARTICIPANTS COULD TAKE TOWARDS CREATING A SITUATION OF GREATER STABILITY. IT WOULD ESTABLISH A BARRIER AGAINST WAR OF ANY KIND IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

10. IN HAS BEEN ARGUED THAT THE WESTERN APPROACH IN ITS CONCENTRATION ON THE ELIMINATION OF THE DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER WAS "SELECTIVE". THIS IS INDEED SO. HOW COULD IT BE OTHERWISE? WE ARE INDEED TRYING TO ISOLATE THOSE FACTORS WHICH ARE AT THE SOURCE OF THE PROBLEM. AN APPROACH WHICH FAILED TO FOCUS ON THE REAL POTENTIAL CAUSE OF AN ARMED CONFLICT IN CENTRAL EUROPE WOULD SEEM TO US TO BE BOUND TO BE INEFFECTIVE. ONLY IF WE ISOLATE, AND THEREFORE CORRECTLY PERCEIVE, THE RELEVANT CAUSES OF INSTABILITY - THE DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCES- CAN WE DEVELOP THE RELEVANT SOLUTION: AN EQUILIBRIUM IN GROUND FORCES. THEREFORE, AN OVERALL COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCES MANPOWER AND SUBSTANTIAL DECREASE IN THE VERY LARGE EASTERN SUPERIORITY IN MAIN BATTLE TANKS WOULD BE ESSENTIAL. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT, AS WE ON OUR SIDE ALSO DO, ALL OTHER FORCE ELEMENTS BEARING ON THE MILITARY SITUATION IN THE AREA UNDER CONSIDERATION DOES NOT ALTER THE FORCE OF THIS POINT.

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

11. WE DO NOT CONSIDER ACCURATE THE ARGUMENT SOMETIMES ADVANCED THAT THE DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCES WOULD NOT REMAIN THE MAIN ISSUE IF ALL FORCE ELEMENTS IN THE AREA WERE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION. THE AIR FORCES STATIONED WITHIN THE AREA ARE NOT SUCH AS TO COUNTERACT THE INSTABILITY CAUSED BY THE DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCES. AS REGARDS NUCLEAR FORCES, THOSE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE AREA DO NOT ELIMINATE THE PROBLEM OF THE INSTABILITY ARISING FROM THE LARGE DISPARITIES IN THE CONVENTIONAL FORCE RELATIONSHIP. THEREFORE IT WAS AFTER CAREFUL ASSESSMENT OF ALL FORCE ELEMENTS IN THE AREA THAT WE CONCLUDED THAT THE DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCES REMAINED THE KEY ISSUE TO BE DEALT WITH IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

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12. MY COLLEAGUES AND I HAVE HEARD THE VIEW FROM EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER WOULD CHANGE THE EXISTING FORCE RELATIONSHIP TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE EAST.

13. A CHANGE OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF GROUND FORCES IS IN FACT NECESSARY, GIVEN THE MAGNITUDE OF THE DISCREPANCIES IN THIS FIELD. IT HAS BEEN CLAIMED IN THIS CONNECTION THAT THIS DISCREPANCY WHICH OUR SIDE PERCEIVED AS DESTABILIZING HAD COME ABOUT AS THE RESULT OF SPECIFIC HISTORICAL FACTORS. WHAT SHOULD DECISIVELY CARRY WEIGHT, AT ANY RATE, IN THIS YEAR OF 1974, IS, HOWEVER, THE FACT THAT THE MAINTENANCE OF DISPROPORTIONATELY LARGE EASTERN GROUND FORCES DOES NOT CORRESPOND TO THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS WHICH HAVE CHARACTERIZED THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP IN EUROPE FOR A CONSIDERABLE TIME.

14. MOREOVER, IT DOES NOT SEEM TO US A REALISTIC VIEW FOR PARTICIPANTS TO REGARD SECURITY AS A GIVEN, FIXED QUANTITY OF A COMMODITY WHICH COULD POSSIBLY BE UNEVENLY DIVIDED BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. THE OPPOSITE IS TRUE, SECURITY IN EUROPE SIMPLY CANNOT BE COMPARED TO WEIGHTSCALES HIGH ON ONE SIDE AND LOW ON THE OTHER. ON THE CONTRARY, IN A SITUATION OF OVERALL NUCLEAR PARITY, SECURITY IS EQUALLY SHARED OR EQUALLY MISSING ON BOTH SIDES. IN SUCH A SITUATION, SECURITY CAN ONLY BE SHARED TO THE SAME DEGREE AND SIMULTANEOUSLY BE INCREASED OR DECREASED ON EITHER SIDE. CONSEQUENTLY, IN THE PRESENT SITUATION OF DISEQUILIBRIUM IN GROUND FORCES, NEITHER SIDE CAN FEEL COMPLETELY SECURE.

BOTH SIDES HAVE REASON TO FEAR POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE INSTABILITY CONNECTED WITH A PRONOUNCED DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCES. CONSEQUENTLY, TOO, BOTH SIDES FEEL MORE SECURE IF OVERALL STABILITY WERE IMPROVED AS THE RESULT OF A COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER.

15. MOREOVER, READINESS OF BOTH SIDES TO ULTIMATELY ACHIEVE AN OVERALL COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER WOULD SIGNAL TO THE WORLD THAT THE PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS NO LONGER FOCUSED ON PAST HISTORY BUT ON CREATING THE CONDITIONS FOR A BRIGHTER FUTURE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. WE CANNOT APPROVE A CONTRARY APPROACH WHICH
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WOULD INVOLVE MAINTAINING THE EXISTING RELATIONSHIP OF GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND EVEN ENSHRINING IT IN AN AGREEMENT. ANY AGREEMENT WE REACH SHOULD BE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF CREATING A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP. EVEN A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, WHICH WOULD NOT INVOLVE REDUCTIONS LARGE ENOUGH TO REACH A COMMON CEILING, SHOULD CONTAIN A COMMITMENT TO THE COMMON CEILING GOAL.

16. IN OTHER WORDS: THE WESTERN COMMON CEILING OBJECTIVE AIMS TO BRING ABOUT A SOLUTION THROUGH WHICH THE SECURITY OF BOTH SIDES WOULD BE SIMULTANEOUSLY INCREASED. WHAT WE PROPOSE IS GENUINELY INTENDED TO ENHANCE STABILITY AND STRENGTHEN SECURITY RECIPROCALLY. WE TRUST THEREFORE THAT THE COMMON CEILING GOAL WILL BE MUTUALLY PERCEIVED BY GOVERNMENTS - AS IT WOULD BE UNDOUBTEDLY BY THE PUBLIC OPINION - AS SOUND, EQUITABLE AND AS THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY OF MINIMIZING THE RISKS OF ANY TYPE OF ARMED CONFLICT IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

17. MR. CHAIRMAN, A COMMON CEILING, TO BE REACHED THROUGH REDUCTIONS NEGOTIATED IN DETAIL IN A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS, WOULD BE AN OVERALL CEILING ON EACH SIDE TO WHICH ALL GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS WOULD BE SUBJECT.

18. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE REPEATEDLY ASKED WHY WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE UNITED STATES DO NOT INTEND TO REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET. SINCE THE REASONS FOR THIS POSITION, WHICH IS SHARED BY ALL OF THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS, DO NOT APPEAR TO BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD, IT SEEMS WORTHWHILE TO RESTATE THEM ON THIS OCCASION.

19. THE HISTORY OF THE PAST 25 YEARS IN EUROPE HAS NOT BEEN A HAPPY ONE. THE CONCERN AND DOUBTS WHICH HAVE

ARISEN DURING THIS PERIOD ARE NOT EASILY DISPELLED.
THIS IS WHY THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS DESIRE THAT THE
USSR AND, WITH IT, THE UNITED STATES SHOULD TAKE
THE FIRST SUBSTANTIAL STEP IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE BOTH THE
GENUINENESS OF GOODWILL AND THE FEASIBILITY OF THE
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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

THIS UNDERSTANDABLE ATTITUDE IS A POSITION WHICH
PARTICIPANTS SHOULD RESPECT. THE FACT THAT EASTERN
DIRECT PARTICIPANTS MAY FEEL DIFFERENTLY ABOUT
REDUCING FROM THE OUTSET DOES NOT CHANGE THIS SITUATION.
THE TERRITORIES OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THE GDR AND POLAND
ARE SITUATED IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE SOVIET UNION. ON
THE OTHER HAND, THE PRINCIPAL MILITARY POWER OF THE NATO
ALLIANCE, THE UNITED STATES, IS AN OCEAN AWAY FROM ITS
EUROPEAN ALLIES.

21. A COMMITMENT IN A PHASE I AGREEMENT TO AN OVERALL
COMMON CEILING OBJECTIVE WOULD CREATE FOR THOSE WESTERN
COUNTRIES NOT INVOLVED IN PHASE I REDUCTIONS THE NECESSARY
CONDITIONS OF CONFIDENCE FOR REDUCING THEIR FORCES IN A
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SECOND PHASE. MY COLLEAGUES AND I COULD AGREE IN PARTICULAR
TO THE CONTINUATION OF NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD
OF TIME AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE OF A SATISFACTORY PHASE I
AGREEMENT. WE HAVE ALSO SAID THAT THE SECOND PHASE REDUCTIONS
ON THE WESTERN SIDE WOULD FOCUS ON GROUND FORCES OTHER THAN
UNITED STATES FORCES. IT WOULD ON THE OTHER HAND BE
UNREALISTIC TO ASK WESTERN COUNTRIES TO MAKE FURTHER
COMMITMENTS REGARDING THEIR PARTICIPATION IN REDUCTIONS
UNLESS THE EASTERN COUNTRIES ARE WILLING TO MAKE
EQUIVALENT COMMITMENTS ON A COMMON CEILING.

22. MR. CHAIRMAN, AT THE BEGINNING OF MY STATEMENT, I
CHARACTERIZED THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT AS A KEY ELEMENT
OF THE WESTERN OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS. I HAVE ENDEAVOURED
TO EXPLAIN WHY THIS IS SO THE WESTERN SIDE COULD
NOT BE EXPECTED TO ENTER INTO AN AGREEMENT WHICH
PRESERVED THE EXISTING RELATIONSHIP OF GROUND FORCES
AND EVEN CODIFIED IT. WE SHOULD FOCUS OUR ATTENTION
NOT ON PAST HISTORY BUT ON CREATING THE CONDITIONS
FOR STABILITY IN THE FUTURE. THIS IS THE
FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE WHICH MUST BE TACKLED IF THESE
NEGOTIATIONS ARE TO SUCCEED. END TEXT HUMES

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